We examine the price impact cost of block trades across three trading mechanisms: the upstairs market, a crossing network system, and the limit order book. While, unsurprisingly, both the upstairs market and crossing system provide lower price impact costs for block trades than downstairs, using unique exogenous measures of market access we find no evidence that competition from these external markets has an adverse affect. Thus despite the threat that they drain liquidity and cream-skim to harm the main market, these alternative trading mechanisms are Pareto-improving for all investor classes and market participants regardless of which market is the major focus.
1.

Introduction
Financial markets around the world typically feature a variety of economic mechanisms to achieve trade, a reflection of the heterogeneity among investors.
Virtually all market systems without overt restrictions to the contrary embody some form of upstairs intermediation, where institutional traders can execute large-block trades through negotiated brokerage or electronic crossing. The existence of such systems, whether formalized or not, raises natural questions about market efficiency and liquidity. In particular, questions arise as to whether such systems fragment markets or, by separating liquidity traders from others, have a detrimental impact on the regular ("downstairs") market.
We examine competition and potential complementarities between three market systems: Firstly, the "upstairs" market that occurs in the broker's office offexchange where large institutional counterparties to a block trade negotiate over the telephone, typically with the one crossing broker who provides a search role by locating the counterparties. Secondly, crossing networks in which participants enter multiple unpriced anonymous orders which cross at specified times at prices set in the downstairs market with typically not a high execution probability. Thirdly, the downstairs market where anonymous trading takes place via a consolidated electronic order book and instantaneous market orders or on the exchange floor, as is the case with the NYSE. In particular, we utilize a trading eligibility rule which exogenously and differentially limits access to the upstairs market to show that the upstairs market has no harmful effects on the downstairs market due to fragmentation, cream skimming or opacity of the upstairs market.
Recent empirical evidence provided by Booth et al (2002) is consistent with Seppi's (1990) model in which uninformed block traders prefer the upstairs market while price discovery (informed trading) largely take place downstairs. Since there is a different functionality between the two markets, both may coexist in equilibrium, at least in theory. But if the presence of the upstairs market siphons liquidity away from the downstairs market then both stability and the crucial price discovery process via informed investor trading in the downstairs market is threatened. The same even stronger admonition applies to crossing network systems which potentially have the ability to siphon off critical large uninformed trades from the downstairs market and hence severely damage if not destroy the proper functioning of the downstairs market.
Without such liquidity provision to the downstairs market both the critical process of price discovery and the market impact costs borne by traders in the primary market may be severely adversely affected. Indeed, numerous studies (see, e.g., Stoll and Whaley, 1990 , among others) document a relation between security market structure and measures of market quality such as volatility, liquidity, and spreads.
While the effects of the siphoning order-flow away from the primary market by upstairs markets and crossing networks has largely not been addressed, these is evidence in relation to selective intervention via "purchased" order-flow and competition from new or regional markets. Easley et al (1996) find that by "creamskimming" the order flow, new markets can fragment the existing market and consequently undermine both the viability of old markets and the trading process itself. Battalio (1997) finds that when the third-market broker-dealer, Bernard L.
Madoff Investment Securities, began selectively purchasing order-flow that there was no damaging impact on adverse selection costs for the NYSE. Hence "creamskimming" would not appear harmful in this instance.
Using data from the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), this paper studies the price impact cost of block trades across these three trading mechanism, the upstairs market, a crossing system and the downstairs market. We estimate the price improvement offered by both the upstairs market and crossing network and address the important policy issue of market fragmentation: whether the existence of the upstairs market adversely affects the downstairs market impact cost and the liquidity provided by the electronic limit order book.
A new approach is used to compare the price impact cost of block trades across trading mechanisms. This procedure controls for market selection bias in a simple and logical manner. Our results show that most block trades on the ASX are executed in the upstairs market, and after controlling for market conditions such as the bid-ask spread in the downstairs market and trade difficulty, both the upstairs market and crossing system provide lower price impact costs for block trades than does the consolidated electronic limit order book. The results from further analysis show that the upstairs market price improvement relative to the downstairs market is positively related to market-condition related trade difficulty measures such as downstairs bidask spread. It is also positively related to the cross-sectional ease of trade variable, stock size, i.e., market capitalization. This implies that ease of trading downstairs, as proxied by stock size, actually encourages upstairs price improvement. By contrast, all block trades in the crossing network system in our sample are trades of index stocks and the price improvement is positively related only to the cross-sectional trade difficulty measure.
Our finding of a positive price improvement in the upstairs market is consistent with previous research, e.g., Keim and Madhavan (1996) , Madhavan and Cheng (1997) , Smith et al (2001) and Booth et al (2002) . Moreover, in keeping with Madhavan and Cheng (1997) , but in strict contrast to Booth et al (2002) who examine the relatively illiquid Helsinki Stock Exchange, we find that the price improvement is economically small in the upstairs market but much greater with respect to crossing networks.
1 However, regardless of the economic magnitudes involved, block traders who go voluntarily upstairs or into crossing networks are better off. In a rational world where traders are not forced to trade upstairs or in a crossing network, this result is hardly surprising. Pagano (1989a Pagano ( , 1989b examines consolidation of multiple markets at a point in time, while Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) examine intertemporal consolidation in a single market. Pagano and Roell (1996) examine the relative performance of auction and dealer markets in the provision of liquidity. Seppi (1997) examines liquidity provision in the context of competition between a monopoly specialist and a competitive limit order book. Both Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) and Donges and Heineman (2002) focus explicitly on competition between the downstairs market and a crossing network. Mendelson (1987) discusses network externalities. Hamilton (1979) points out that spreads could either narrow due to increased multimarket competition or be higher due to loss of scale economies and lower probabilities of execution. See also Garbade and Silber (1979) , Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1982) and Gehrig (1993) for related arguments.
flow, the lack of transparency away from primary markets 3 , "front-running", the unwillingness to expose public limit orders during trading hours, e.g., the upstairs market on the ASX is not exposed to the limit order book, and the inability to expose limit orders after the close of trading. Exchanges view upstairs-market and crossing networks traders as "free-riding" off their price discovery, and as a threat to their existence because they could divert uninformed orders away from the consolidated electronic order book and increase the adverse selection problem in the primary market. Booth et al (2002) uses Helsinki Stock Exchange data and provides evidence leaning towards this "free-riding" view of upstairs trading in the price discovery process. Specifically, they use a vector error correction model to show that the proportion of private information in downstairs market that is incorporated into upstairs prices is approximately four times that in the other direction 4 .
As with any free-riding behavior, it is due to the absence of property rights. In this case the inability to charge an appropriate price for the use of the downstairs quotes resulting from the price discovery process. Mulherin, Netter, and Overdahl (1991) document the long history of attempts by the NYSE to prevent off-market trading as embodied in NYSE Rule 390 which prevents NYSE member firms from conducting an over-the-counter market or matching orders in-house via a crossing system. While notionally anticompetitive in intent in that it prevents member firms from competing with the NYSE in-house specialist, Mulherin, Netter, and Overdahl (1991) argue that its primary purpose is to encourage trading by minimizing trading costs via a centralized and efficient price discovery process. In this context they see attempts by the SEC and Congress to water down Rule 390 and to promote a national market as no more than free riding on the NYSE quotes, which must inevitably reduce the quality of price information and raise transaction costs. In the face of all this opposition Rule 390 has now been abolished.
As a counterpoint to this potential threat to the downstairs market, fees paid to the exchange on order-flow attracted to upstairs markets such as the broker crossing market for block trades that operates on the ASX are exactly the same as order-flow directed to the downstairs market. The ASX is thus aware of the need to internalize the value of the quotes by charging a fee for access and also for the provision of live 3 In fact, one of the reasons given for why crossing networks such as ITG POSIT have been successful is that the system offers anonymity as well as lower transaction costs but does not provide immediacy nor guarantee even delayed execution (Gresse, 2002). feeds. Moreover, the ASX is now a publicly listed company that is traded on itself and is thus no longer broker-owned. Hence the exchange's only interest is in choosing the best overall market design from the perspective of traders and investors, and not in protecting the downstairs market per se.
The literature has failed to demonstrate the effects of upstairs trading on trading costs incurred downstairs. This critical question, vital to all policy analysis on whether to permit the existence and extent of the upstairs market, has not been addressed. Unfortunately, this lacuna arises for a good reason. Designing such study is difficult without an exogenous factor to vary the level of upstairs trading because the cross-sectional and time series variation in the actual level of upstairs trading in a rational world merely reflects the changes in trading environment, stock characteristics and the investors' optimal market selection decisions. Little can be said about the effect of either upstairs trading or crossing networks on the downstairs market.
In the suggestive study referred to above Gresse (2002) finds that the relative volume placed through a crossing network has no adverse impact on spreads in the downstairs market. Since the relative volumes being placed through the two market types are purely voluntary and are thus endogenous, reflecting market conditions, she is unable to carry out the conceptual experiment of asking would the downstairs market improve if the operation of the crossing network were to be banned altogether, or closed as a result of some exogenous intervention? 5 We are fortunate that the ASX restricts upstairs trading to stock trades of value at or above AUD 1 million. This eligibility rule provides an exogenous barrier to upstairs trading, and prohibits relatively large trades in smaller capitalization stocks from trading in the upstairs market. 6 Using this eligibility rule we construct an upstairs market access measure, and examine if the large trades executed in the downstairs market in stocks with better access to the upstairs market suffer a drain of liquidity downstairs, resulting in higher downstairs trading cost. We supplement this 4 See their Tables 4 and 5 . 5 Moreover, the crossing network does not commence operating during her data period and hence there is no exogenous entry event with which to asset its impact. 6 Since trade size is to some extent endogenous it would in principle be possible for a broker to accumulate a large number of trades in a small stock that would otherwise go to the downstairs market and divert them as a single trade in excess of the minimum size limit upstairs. In practice, this is unlikely to happen because of the value of immediacy (cost of time delays) and higher execution costs for large orders.
exogenously determined upstairs market access factor with two endogenously determined upstairs trading measures and find no evidence that upstairs market adversely affect the trading cost of large trades and the average bid-ask spread in the downstairs market.
These findings should alleviate concerns that the upstairs market drains liquidity and cream skims the downstairs market. The lack of adverse impact of the upstairs market on the downstairs market in trading cost may be due to offsetting effects on the downstairs market. While, by definition, a trade directed upstairs is a trade lost from the downstairs market, an active upstairs market may create more large trades and consequently provide a positive externality for the downstairs market, in a similar way to the theoretical mechanism that Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) analyze in the case of crossing networks. However, formal modeling and testing of such hypotheses has be left for future research.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional details and data. Section 3 presents the study of the price impact cost comparison and section 4 shows the effect of upstairs trading on the downstairs price impact cost of large trades. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of some of the policy implications of our findings.
Institutional Details and Data
Trading on the ASX
The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) conducts all listed equities trading in Australia. Since 1987 floor trading has given way to a fully computerized trading system named the Stock Exchange Automated Trading System (SEATS). SEATS opens trading in a stock with a call auction between 10:00 a.m. and 10:15 a.m.
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Continuous trading commences after the initial auction and continues until 4:00 p.m.
Since May 1997 SEATS also perform a closing call auction shortly after the closure of continuous trading, currently at 4:15 p.m. SEATS allows both limit and market orders to be submitted. It is based on the CATS automated system and is typical of many markets around the world (see Domowitz, 1990 Domowitz, , 1993 In addition, only specials may trade off-market during SEATS normal trading hours.
The ASX mandates that all specials executed during SEATS normal trading hours must be reported to the exchange via SEATS as soon as possible. Hence the trade reporting arrangements are in principle as timely and onerous in terms of transparency as in the SEATS downstairs market. 12 There are no delays allowed, as is 7 The exact open time is random and stock-specific. The system randomly picks a stock from an ascending alphabetical group of stocks in different time intervals. 8 Other than maintaining an orderly market (which is not explicitly defined), and not charging brokerage to customers with whom they deal as principal, market-making brokers have no special rights or obligations. There are, for example, no affirmative requirements to make a market or provide price continuity (as are NYSE specialists) if they choose not to, and they will usually only make a market for known customers. 9 Note that the primary (main) market SEATS is already a consolidated electronic limit order book.
Therefore, there is no ECN, such as Island, that operates in Australia. 10 This rule has been effective since 14 October 1996. Lower thresholds applied previously. 11 This is contrary to the very strict rules on the NYSE that strongly discourage trades via crossing brokers. Thus a broker must make a public bid on both sides of the cross at one tick higher than their bid (see Smith et al, 2001 Smith et al, , p.1729 ) and all upstairs trades must be exposed to the floor market. 12 While in principle, reporting and time stamping is the same upstairs as downstairs, the human intervention and time required upstairs in the form of negotiations over the phone inevitably lead to small reporting delays which do not occur with the fully automated electronic limit order book.
the case on the London Stock Exchange. However, the requirements outside normal trading hours are less onerous; specials and other trades are required to be reported, but only at a time no later than fifteen minutes prior to the opening for trading on the following day.
Data
The data examined in this study is extremely comprehensive and consists of all trades in all ASX stocks from January 1993 to December 1998. Transaction data is extracted from the SEATS database of the ASX, which contains a complete record of every order and trade entered into SEATS. The data contains a field that identifies whether a transaction was executed off-market or not. Direct identification of offmarket trades is not possible using public data for U.S. exchanges such as the TAQ data. Previous studies, such as Keim and Madhavan (1996) and Madhavan and Cheng (1997) , focus on limited subsets of stocks or use indirect methods to identify trades matched outside the primary exchange.
Using the SEATS data, we screened every transaction record in every stock in the sample period. In order to compute the trade size and frequency correctly, SEATS trades that were executed across multiple limit orders are aggregated using the corresponding order reference numbers. Corrections were made for cancelled or error records, such as missing digits. The sample consists of a total of twenty-five million Table 1 shows that block trades concentrates in the most heavily traded stocks. The top dollar trading volume decile stocks alone account for 92.4% of all block trades. Table 2 shows the proportion of these trades executed in the upstairs market and crossing network. Panel A shows that the upstairs market is the most commonly used mechanism for block trading in Australia. The upstairs market accounts for eighty percent of the total number of block trades across all stocks and years. The distribution across volume decile shows that there is a tendency for a higher proportion of upstairs trades in less well-traded stocks. This is consistent with the search role of the upstairs market in Easley and O'Hara (1986).
The bulk of the blocks trades that are not executed in the upstairs market are 
Price Impacts
Univariate statistics and method
The price impact cost 14 variable of trade t, c t , is defined as
where, pr t is the price of the block trade t, and pb t is a benchmark price which might be the mid-point of the bid and ask quote on SEATS immediately, or 10 or 20 trades prior to the block trade t. 13 The crossing network crosses orders at a random time during a five-minute interval following the official crossing time, 11 am, 12 pm and 3 pm. The orders that can be matched are reported to SEATS immediately afterwards. The trades of the crossing network operator in the fifteen minutes interval after the official crossing time are marked as crossing network trades. 14 Our measure is the total price impact that indicates the cost of the trade to the client or broker. For our purposes it is not necessary to undertake the difficult and potentially unreliable task of splitting this up into temporary and permanent components, nor for differential estimates for buyer-or sellerinitiated trades.
Block trades are relatively large trades, the underlying trading decision is unlikely to be made immediately, therefore using several lagged benchmark prices to measure the price impact cost of block trades provide a reference of timing cost.
Secondly, and more importantly, blocks trade prices in the upstairs market in particular, and crossing system to a lesser extent, are determined by the brokers prior to reporting the trade to SEATS. This reporting process is done manually; hence it is subject to a certain level of delay. Consequently the price impact cost measures computed using the benchmark price immediate prior to the reported time are not directly comparable across block trades executed across different trading mechanisms.
Finally, as Keim and Madhavan (1996) point out, not only are upstairs trades typically initiated prior to the recording of the actual trade, but there is also an inevitable leakage of information to the downstairs market prior to trade completion. Hence there is a risk of understating the true price impact unless a lagged trade price is utilized.
This observation is evident in Table 3 , which shows the mean and standard error of the price impact cost measures of all block trades. A crossing network, by definition, crosses orders at the mid-point of the bid-ask quote (mid-quote, hereafter), therefore its trades have definitionally, apart from the minimum tick, zero price impact at the time of crossing. However, using the mid-quote immediately prior to the reported time of these trades to compute their price impact cost results in a mean price impact cost of 0.062%, which is significantly different from zero at 5% probability.
Thus, based on the time of initiation, there is actually a small market impact cost.
Using lagged benchmark prices to compute price impact cost generally provide higher impact cost estimates. For instance, using mid-quote 10 or 20 trades prior to the block as benchmark, the mean price impact cost of block trades executed in the crossing network is the lowest, followed by those in SEATS, and lastly those in the upstairs market. The higher unadjusted mean price impact of the upstairs trades relative to downstairs trade is consistent with findings in Madhavan and Cheng (1997), Smith et al (2001) and Booth et al (2002) .
Although univariate statistics provide an estimate of the realised price impact cost of trading blocks across different trading mechanisms, they do not control for trade difficulty or market selection bias that has been noted by several authors.
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) find that upstairs market is more likely to be used for more difficult trades, e.g., for larger trades and when market bid-ask spreads are higher. Conrad et al (2002) find that easier-to-fill trades are send to ECNs and crossing networks. Comparing price impact cost without adjustment for trade difficult is misleading because the higher mean trading cost of upstairs trades, for instance, may simply reflect that they are more difficult trades to execute.
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) pioneered the use of an endogenous switching regression model to account for market selection bias. Conrad et al (2002) also use this technique in studying the difference in the total execution cost between dealership market, crossing system and ECNs using US data. Such a method involves using a binary probability model to estimate the market selection decision, and then feeds the estimated probabilities into the second stage to adjust for the market selection bias. It is elegant but involves pooling the sample of upstairs and downstairs trades and is not well suited to cases where there are more than two choices, as in the present application. In addition, the accuracy of the trade difficulty adjustment is critically dependent on the accuracy in the first stage binary classification estimation 15 , which is difficult to attain with highly unbalanced sample as in our data set. Therefore this paper uses an alternative two-stage procedure to compare the price impact cost of block trades across trading mechanisms.
The first stage involves using block trades executed in SEATS alone to estimate the relationship between the price impact cost and various measures of trade difficulty. In the second stage, the price impact cost of hypothetical SEATS block trades are generated using the trade difficult variables of observed upstairs and crossing network block trades. The price improvement provided by upstairs and crossing network trades is computed by subtracting the actual price impact cost of upstairs and crossing network trades from the price impact cost of the hypothetical SEATS block trades. Finally, we regress the price improvement in the upstairs and crossing network trades on the trade difficulty measures. This procedure avoids the estimation market selection model and trade matching 16 , yet provides a meaning comparison of the price impact cost. 15 We used our data to estimate the probit market selection model between upstairs market and SEATS, as in Madhavan and Cheng (1997) . The model is statistically significant at 0% probability. However, the proportion of correct market classification does not seem economically significantly different from that of a naïve rule that predicts that all trades should be executed upstairs. 16 If market selection is a real concern, observed trades can be the result of a separating equilibrium such that there would be no way to perfectly match the trade difficulty condition of trades executed across different systems. For instance, if the upstairs market were used only if the electronic limit order
The first stage
The first stage SEATS block trade price impact cost regression model takes the following form: is a dummy that equals 1 on or after 2/7/1997, the day that the crossing network commenced operation, and ε t is the residual term.
The first five independent variables are intended to capture the market condition and trade specific factors that will affect the price impact cost. The use of the bid-ask spread as a measure of adverse selection and market illiquidity is widely used both in theoretical and empirical research. Since the price impact cost of a block trade is more likely to be higher when there is higher level of adverse selection and market illiquidity, we expect the sign of α 2 to be positive. However, the effect of the bid-ask spread on price impact cost need not be linear because blocks trades are likely to consume limit orders at more than one price step. The square of bid-ask spread is therefore introduced to capture any non-linear effect. We expect the sign of α 3 to be negative.
book is illiquid, it would be difficult to find trades in electronic limit order book of the same size and under the same market conditions. This is because such trade would not have taken place! The third variable, szrdpt ,t , is a trade difficulty measure of trade size relative to the limit order book depth 17 . Normalizing trade size (number of shares) by the limit order book depth has the advantage of being unit free, hence controlling for crosssection differences across stocks. Since the larger a trade relative to market liquidity, the more difficult it is to execute, we expect the sign of α 4 to be positive. Keim and Madhavan (1996) find that the price impact cost of block trades in the upstairs market is a concave function of trade size, hence we introduce the variable szdsq t to control of this potential effect in the downstairs market. If the concavity of size effect is truly due to the screening and searching ability of upstairs brokers, we should not see a statistically significantly negative estimate of α 5 . However, if the concavity is a general aspect of the price impact cost of block trade, then we may observe that in the downstairs market as well.
The fifth variable, time t , is an adverse selection measure inspired by Easley and O'Hara (1992) who predict that short-lived private information is more likely to be exploited sooner than later, such that the information content of a trade of a given size is smaller when it is executed later in a trading day. We expect the sign of α 6 to be negative.
The next three variables are cross-sectional control variables. The market capitalization variable, lmcap t , is defined over the calendar year (as opposed to at the time of trade) in order to insulate the cross-sectional differences from the effect of day-to-day changes in the price level of a stock. As larger stocks produce more public information released to the market and have a greater analyst following than do smaller stocks, the adverse selection risk in trading larger stock is also likely to be smaller. Consequently, trading difficulty should diminish in market capitalization.
Thus we expect the sign of α 7 to be negative. Both variables, indx t and ldlyv t , are cross-sectional liquidity variables which should indicate greater ease of trade. They are thus inverse cross-sectional trade difficulty variables. We expect block trades in benchmark index composite stocks and more heavily traded stocks to have a smaller price impact cost than non-indexed or less heavily traded stocks. Hence the signs of 17 Keim and Madhavan (1996) utilize a squared trade size measure to capture the non-linearity in the effect of trade size on price effect of block trades and the coefficient was significant. We did introduce such a squared term but the sign is not statistically significant. We also experimented with a commonly used variable, the inverse of stock price, but once again, its coefficient is not statistically significant. We believe that the statistical insignificance of these variables is due to the adequacy of the variables used in the current specification by way of controlling for cross-sectional differences.
α 8 and α 9 should both be negative if easier to trade stocks have less price improvement.
Finally, we introduce a time series dummy to control for the entrance of the crossing network into the Australian market. If such an increase in competition improves liquidity for traders, the sign of α 10 should be negative. Table 4 presents the estimation of regression model (2) using the mid-quote immediately, 10 and 20 trades prior to the block trade as benchmark price. The model performs well. The F-statistic suggests that the model is statistically significant at 0% probability level and the adjusted r-squared varies from 31% to 71%. All coefficient estimates are of the expected sign. The bid-ask spread has a positive but decreasing effect on price impact cost (α 1 is positive and α 2 is negative, and both are statistically significant at the 1% probability level in five out of six cases). The positive and statistically significant estimates of α 4 suggest that larger trades relative to limit order book depth are more costly to execute on SEATS than are smaller trades. The lack of statistical significance of the estimates of α 5 indicates that the price impact cost is not concave in size in the downstairs market. This is consistent with the interpretation that concavity is due to searching and screening ability specific to the upstairs market (we shall see confirming evidence in the upstairs market later).
The negative and statistically significant coefficient α 6 in the lagged measures of price impact cost suggests that price impact cost is decreasing over the trading day.
Stocks that are a composite of the benchmark index and are more heavily traded have a lower price impact cost when measured with lagged benchmark prices (significantly negative α 8 and α 9 ). Finally, the cross-sectional difference in market capitalization and the introduction of the crossing network do not show a statistically significant effect on any price impact cost measures of block trades on SEATS. For the former variable, its lack of statistically significance reflects that trading volume and index inclusion are adequate for controlling for the cross-sectional differences in price impact cost. For the latter variable, its lack of statistical significance suggests that traders utilizing the limit order book either did not see the introduction of the crossing network as a competitive threat or that quote prices cannot be improved further.
The second stage
The trade difficulty adjusted price improvement of the upstairs market and crossing network trade u over the price impact cost of hypothetical SEATS trades is computed as:
where u ĉ = α 1 + α 2 pspd u + α 3 pspdsq u + α 4 szrdpt u + α 5 szdsq u + α 6 time u + α 7 lmcap u + α 8 indx u + α 9 ldlyv u + α 10 ent u , and c u is computed as per (1).
The mean of piprv u should be positive if the upstairs market and crossing network provide price improvement over the downstairs SEATS market. Table 5 contains the univariate statistics of the price improvement estimate, piprv u . The mean estimated price improvement of the upstairs market and the crossing system over the SEATS prices are positive and statistically significantly at 1% probability level, except for the case of upstairs price improvement estimated using the mid-quote immediately prior to the time of reported trade. As mentioned above, since there is a certain level of reporting delay, particularly in upstairs trades, the negative price improvement estimate merely reflects this incomparability. This reporting delay bias is partially adjusted by using lagged benchmark prices. The mean estimated price improvement of the upstairs market is between two to four basis points (0.021-0.040 percent) while that of crossing network is much more substantial, thirteen to sixteen basis points (0.136-0.177). The former estimate of upstairs price improvement is of a very similar magnitude to the estimate in Madhavan and Cheng (1997) using stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Index (no more than 2 basis points) but much smaller than the estimate in Booth et al (2002) which uses data from the relatively illiquid Helsinki Stock Exchange (30 basis points). This finding provides strong evidence that the upstairs market and crossing network deliver price improvement in executing block trades over the consolidated electronic limit order book after adjusting for trade difficulty. otherwise a large enough trade will have a negative price impact.
Theoretical research, such as Easley and O'Hara (1986), Seppi (1990) , and Grossman (1992), also suggests that upstairs brokers provide a search function when there is a lack of liquidity, as well as acting as a filter for informed trades. Consistent with this idea, we expect that the price improvement due to the upstairs market should also be positively related to other trade difficult measures. Consequently, the sign of β 2 should be positive, while the sign of β 3 , β 6 , β 7 , β 8 , and β 9 should be negative. This assumes that the bid-ask spread downstairs is exogenous and is thus not determined by the upstairs market. Our results presented in Table 10 below confirms the validity of this assumption. In addition, if the introduction of the crossing network imposes more competitive pressure on the upstairs market that on SEATS, the price improvement in the upstairs market should be higher after the introduction of the crossing network. This should imply that β 10 is positive.
Since crossing-networks are designed to lower transaction costs via the elimination of the bid-ask spread in the downstairs market, we expect to find a positive relationship between the price improvement provided by the crossing network and bid-ask spread. Since not a great deal is known about the properties of crossing networks, we do not have strong hypotheses concerning the relationship between the crossing network's price improvement over the limit order book and other trade difficulty variables. Table 6 presents the estimates of regression model (4) for the upstairs block trade sample. The model is statistically significant at the 1% probability level based on the F-statistic and the adjusted r-squared varies from 6% to 18%. Since using the mid-quote price immediately prior to the reported time of upstairs trade generates severely biased estimates of both price impact and price improvement, we only present the regression results for upstairs trades using two sets of lagged benchmark prices.
The coefficients on the market condition and trade specific variables are of the expected sign and they are all statistically significant at the 1% probability level. The bid-ask spread has a positive but decreasing relationship with upstairs market price improvement, positive β 2 and negative β 3 . Upstairs market price improvement is also increasing in trade size but at a decreasing rate, positive β 4 and negative β 5 . These findings support the concavity of upstairs price impact cost in trade size, as both predicted and found by Keim and Madhavan (1996) . The negative estimates of β 5
suggest that there is a natural limit to the upstairs price improvement as a function of trade size.
The time of day that the trade occurs has a negative effect on price improvement upstairs, i.e., negative β 6 . This is consistent with less informed trading, and hence a smaller screening benefit, later in a trading day.
We conclude that upstairs market price improvement is higher under more difficult market conditions that are time varying, such as when there is an exogenously given high bid-ask spread in the downstairs market. The upstairs market price improvement, however, has a weak to positive relationship with the crosssectional ease of trade (inverse difficulty) variables. The coefficient estimate on the index inclusion and average daily dollar trading volume variables are not statistically significant at the 1% probability level (β 8 and β 9 ), while that of the market capitalization variable (β 7 ) is positive and statistically significant. This finding suggests that upstairs market price improvement for block trades is larger for the larger stocks (less difficult trades) than for smaller stocks (more difficult trades). This result might be due to the lack of "unexpressed orders" for smaller stocks, hence undermining the relative advantage of the upstairs market, or it could be related to the difficulty that smaller stocks have in meeting the ASX's upstairs eligibility rule of AUD 1 million or more.
Finally, there is some weak evidence that the commencement of the crossing network is associated with increased upstairs market price improvement. Specifically, β 10 is statistically significantly positive at 1% probability level in the model that uses mid-quote 20 trades prior to the block trade as the benchmark price. The coefficient is still positive but statistically insignificant in the other model. Table 7 presents the estimate of regression model (4) using the crossing network block trade sample. The variable indx u and ent u are omitted in this regression because all trades are crossing network trades and all stocks traded in the crossing network are index stocks, therefore these two variables always take the value of 1 in the sample. The F-statistic and adjusted r-squared suggest the model is statistically significant. Given that Table 3 shows that the error in estimating the price impact cost of crossing trades is the smallest when the benchmark price is set at the mid-point immediately prior to trade, we focus on the result presented in Panel A, which use this benchmark price to compute the price improvement.
Columns 1 and 2 list the estimates for the full model. The estimates show that the overriding factor determining the price improvement due to the crossing network is the bid-ask spread. Hence the more illiquid is the downstairs market both crosssectionally and over time, the greater the price improvement. The estimates of β 2 are consistently positive and statistically significant at the 1% probability level. The significance of the bid-ask spread in this regression is an expected outcome since the purpose of a crossing network is to eliminate the bid-ask spread. However, it is surprising that the results in Panels B and C, which used lagged benchmark prices, suggest an inconsistent sign in the estimate of β 2 . It is likely that noise introduced by lagging the benchmark is causing this inconsistency.
In Panel A, the other variables generally do not have statistically significant coefficient estimates at the conventional probability level. This combination of high rsquared (59%) and low t-statistics (maximum of 2.62) across the variables suggests that multicollinearity may be a problem, particularly in this sample that contains only 
Impact of Upstairs Trading on Downstairs Liquidity
Issues and Method
The literature and the previous section have conclusively documented the existence of lower adjusted price impact costs of both upstairs and crossing network trades. From the assumption of rational trading decisions 18 , the result is expected. A more important and harder question is the consequences of market fragmentation on the main market. Specifically, what is the impact of upstairs trading and alternative trading systems on primary market liquidity? While upstairs market and alternative trading system offers lower trading cost to traders in a position to participate in them, they divert order flows from the downstairs markets and may result in increased trading cost in the downstairs market (see Grossman, 1990 , and the cream-skimming literature cited above). The empirical literature on upstairs trading has been silent on this issue.
In this section we use three different measures of upstairs trading to examine if the availability and the actual level of upstairs trading has a positive effect on the price impact of cost of large trades and average bid-ask spread in the downstairs market. The first one is a measure of upstairs market access, uma, exploiting the unique business rule imposed by the ASX that prohibits upstairs trading during trading hours for trades in a single stock of value less than AUD 1 million. This measure of market fragmentation has the advantage that it is dependent on an exogenous rule that traders cannot control, hence permitting a separation of stocks with fragmented markets and integrated markets (stocks with no trades of AUD 1 million or above in value). We define uma j,y as the proportion of the top 1% downstairs trades in trade value in stock j, year y that have a trade value of AUD 1 million or above. The higher is uma j,y , the higher is the proportion of the trades having access to the upstairs market. If market fragmentation has an adverse effect on liquidity in the downstairs market, we should observe that, all else equal, higher price impact costs for larger trades and higher average bid-ask spreads for stocks with higher uma j,y values.
As a robustness check, the second and third measures of upstairs trading and market fragmentation are introduced. They are utn j,y , the ratio of the actual number of upstairs trades to the total number of upstairs and downstairs trades (no trade size restrictions) in stock j, year y, and utv j,y the ratio of the dollar value of upstairs trades to the dollar value of upstairs and downstairs trades (no trade size restrictions) in stock j, year y. Again, the higher the value of these ratios, the higher is the level of upstairs trading and market fragmentation. If upstairs trading adversely affect the downstairs market, these ratios should be positively related to average downstairs price impact cost and average bid-ask spread.
18 Since upstairs market and crossing systems offer an alternative to trading downstairs and traders are not forced to trade in these markets, they would only trade in these alternative markets if it were to their own benefit.
In order to test these hypotheses we also need to define the average downstairs price impact cost and bid-ask spread. Since upstairs trading during trading hours on the ASX is only feasible for large trades, we focus on analyzing the trade-weighted average price impact cost, atc j,y , of the top 1% downstairs trades in trade value 19 in analyzing the price impact cost. A relative average price impact measure, ratc j,y ,is also computed by scaling the average price impact cost of the top percentile trade with the average price impact cost of medium size trades (40-60% percentile) in order to further control stock specific trading cost differences. They are formally defined as follows: Given that we expect stock specific characteristics to affect both the price impact cost and bid-ask spread, we estimate the relationship between them and the market fragmentation measures using the following regression specification:
19 The 1% threshold is chosen to generate maximum variation in the variable uma j,t . Specifically, the AUD 1 million requirement for upstairs trading is already larger than the smallest trade in the top 1% of downstairs trades even for the most liquid stock on the ASX in any given year. Moving to a lower threshold would only reduce the variation in this variable. We also re-estimate all models of average price impact cost using the 2-5% percentile downstairs trades, the 40-60% percentile downstairs trades, and the ratio of the average price impact cost of the top 1% downstairs trades to that of the top 40-60% downstairs trades. The qualitative results are identical and the tables are available on request. Since stocks that are components of a stock index or with higher trading volume and market capitalization are more liquid, we expect, δ 2 , δ 3 and δ 5 to be negative. Liquidity provision in stocks with a higher return standard deviation is more costly. Hence we expect δ 4 to be positive. Finally, if upstairs trading drains liquidity from the downstairs market, we should observe positive estimates of δ 6 . utn j,y , utv j,y are less than 0.2. The variation is the largest for uma j,y (0-1), followed by that of utv j,y (0-0.67) and utn j,y (0-0.11).
Results
The regression estimates for atc j,y and ratc j,y are presented in Table 9 The qualitative results at all three lags are identical and therefore only the zero lag results are shown. 21 This is significantly higher than the average price impact of all SEATS trades over AUD 1 million in Table 3 (21 basis point) because Table 8 shows values that weight every stock equally. The price impact cost of smaller and relatively illiquid stocks are pulling the average up. In Table 3 , the average is across trades in liquid stocks (since they are trades of AUD 1 million or above in value) hence the value is much lower.
and mostly statistical significant at the 5% probability level or better in both Panel A The main coefficient of interest is δ 6 . None of the estimates across Panel A and B is statistically significantly positive at 5% probability level. This suggests that neither the level of upstairs market access, nor the actual level of upstairs trading, has a statistically significant adversely effect on the price impact of large trades in the downstairs market. This finding should alleviate concerns as to the negative effect of market fragmentation and cream skimming, at least as far as the upstairs market is concerned. To the contrary, one of the six estimates of δ 6 is statistically significantly negative at 5% probability level. Specifically, the result from the second model in Panel B suggests that the higher is the number of upstairs block trades relative to the total number of trades in the upstairs and downstairs market, the lower is the price impact cost of the largest trades in the downstairs market relative to the price impact cost of medium size downstairs trades. However, we are conscious that a one-in-six finding does not represent strong support for a negative relationship between upstairs trading and downstairs trading cost. 
Conclusion
Using data from the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), this paper studies the price impact cost of block trades across three trading mechanism, the upstairs market, an electronic crossing network system and a consolidated electronic limit order book.
We estimate the price improvement offered by both the upstairs market and crossing network. We then exploit a unique trading rule imposed by the ASX to address the central issue of market fragmentation: whether upstairs intermediation adversely affects market quality.
Our results show that most block trades on the ASX are executed in the upstairs market and, after controlling for market conditions and trade difficulty, both the upstairs market and crossing system provide lower price impact cost for block trades than the consolidated electronic limit order book. The results from further analysis show that the upstairs market price improvement is positively related to downstairs time-varying market-condition related trade difficulty measures such as the bid-ask spread, but also surprisingly positively related to the cross-sectional ease of trade measure, stock size. By contrast, all block trades in the crossing system in our sample are trades of indexed stocks and the price improvement is positively related to the bid-ask spread and only to one cross-sectional trade difficulty measure, specifically, stocks with lower trading volume. There is also some evidence that the introduction of crossing system in Australia is associated with a statistically significant increase in the price improvement in the upstairs market.
Using three measures of upstairs market access, of which one is exogenously determined and two are endogenous, we find no evidence that the upstairs market both drains liquidity and cream skims the downstairs market. Indeed, the introduction and functioning of an upstairs market is Pareto improving since no market or set of market participants is harmed while investors who utilize the market gain. It is reasonable to suppose that this lack of victims is due to measures taken by the ASX to prevent free riding on the price discovery undertaken in the downstairs electronic order book market. In particular, brokers wishing to trade off-market are charged exactly the same fee as if they had traded downstairs.
What might these results imply for the design of all three markets: upstairs, crossing networks and downstairs markets? Firstly, there may be scope for relaxing many of the severe controls, if not outright bans, on upstairs and crossing activity that are still the norm in markets worldwide. For example, the ASX could replace the minimum block trade size of AUD 1 million across all stocks by a relative size measure for "specials" which does not discriminate so heavily against smaller, lower market capitalization, stocks trading upstairs during the period that the downstairs market is operating, or even abolish size limitations altogether. Exchanges could provide institutional clients, wanting to trade shares with little in the way of rapidly decaying informational value and willing to bear the cost of delayed execution, with venues in which the impact of high bid ask spreads is minimized.
Alternatively, downstairs exchanges could mimic desirable features of the upstairs market so as to provide more liquidity to the limit order book operating in the downstairs market. An advantage possessed by the upstairs crossing broker is knowledge of the identity of the counterparties to each trade. This permits the operation of implicit contracts to penalize or deny access to upstairs markets to clients who "bag the street", that is, impose losses on counterparties due to informational advantages. Similar outcomes could be achieved in the downstairs market by allowing greater disclosure and transparency in the form of voluntary client ID numbers to be displayed together with other details of limit or market orders.
Our results confirm the intuition that diverse trading mechanisms arise endogenously to serve the needs of heterogeneous clienteles. Provided there is a level playing field which prevents off-market trades from free riding off the downstairs quotes, the forces of competition lead to the evolution of complex market structures that add value to all investors. 
